Old Wine in New Bottles : The Kerner Commission\u27s Misgivings about Black Power by Benner, Amelia
Constructing the Past
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 8
2008
Old Wine in New Bottles : The Kerner
Commission's Misgivings about Black Power
Amelia Benner
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History Department at Digital Commons @ IWU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Constructing the Past by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ IWU. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Benner, Amelia (2008) "Old Wine in New Bottles : The Kerner Commission's Misgivings about Black Power,"
Constructing the Past: Vol. 9: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/constructing/vol9/iss1/8
Old Wine in New Bottles : The Kerner Commission's Misgivings about
Black Power
Abstract
The relentless heat seemed to breed violence during the summer of 1967, as the simmering resentment in the
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earlier that summer. In July, troubled by a growing sense of urban lawlessness, President Lyndon Johnston
established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, more commonly called the Kerner
Commission after its chairman, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner. Johnson instructed the commission to provide
a fair assessment of the tide of racially-motivated violence that was sweeping American cities. Their findings,
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they wrote, “one black, one white—separate and unequal.” This assessment came at a time when white
Americans were becoming increasingly concerned by the call for “Black Power,” a slogan often associated with
militant groups such as the Black Panthers. The Kerner Commission’s findings reflect their misgivings about
Black Power and their concern that the doctrine would lead to increased racial tensions in American cities and
make the goal of integration impossible.
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The relentless heat seemed to breed violence during the summer of 1967, as the 
simmering resentment in the overcrowded ghettos of American cities finally boiled over 
into the sun-baked streets. Disputes between local residents and police erupted into 
scenes of looting and vandalism in Newark and Detroit and conjured up disquieting 
memories of the 1965 Watts riots. Rioting had also taken place in Tampa, Cincinnati, and 
Atlanta earlier that summer. In July, troubled by a growing sense of urban lawlessness, 
President Lyndon Johnston established the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, more commonly called the Kerner Commission after its chairman, Illinois 
Governor Otto Kerner. Johnson instructed the commission to provide a fair assessment of 
the tide of racially-motivated violence that was sweeping American cities. Their findings, 
published a year later, were prefaced with a sobering warning: “Our Nation is moving 
toward two societies,” they wrote, “one black, one white—separate and unequal.”
1
 This 
assessment came at a time when white Americans were becoming increasingly concerned 
by the call for “Black Power,” a slogan often associated with militant groups such as the 
Black Panthers. The Kerner Commission’s findings reflect their misgivings about Black 
Power and their concern that the doctrine would lead to increased racial tensions in 
American cities and make the goal of integration impossible. 
  Black Power was hard to define, but its appeal to African-Americans was 
undeniable. The Kerner Commission likened it to “old wine in new bottles,” and 
                                                
1
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suggested that “what is new about Black Power is phraseology rather than substance.”
 2
 
In their report, the commission attributed the popularity of the slogan to the weakening of 
the civil rights movement and a growing disenchantment with nonviolence: 
Powerless to make any fundamental changes in the life of the  
masses…many advocates of Black Power have retreated into an unreal 
world, where they see an outnumbered and poverty-stricken minority 
organizing itself entirely separately from whites and creating sufficient 
power to force white America to grant its demands.
3
 
 
However, black Americans saw things differently. In his 1967 book Black Power and 
Urban Unrest, written in response to the summer’s riots, Dr. Nathan Wright, Jr., defined 
Black Power in a more positive light: “The thrust of Black Power is toward freeing the 
latent power of Negroes to enrich the life of the whole nation.”
4
 Stokely Carmichael, who 
is credited with coining the term “Black Power” during the 1966 Meredith March, called 
on African-Americans to reject the promises of integration and seek power on their own 
terms.
5
 But most white Americans shared the Kerner Commission’s mistrust of Black 
Power, interpreting it as a call to arms against the established social order. The escalation 
of urban violence at the height of the doctrine’s popularity led many to believe that Black 
Power was a threat to the American way of life. 
 The Kerner Commission noted with concern the role of Black Power in the urban 
riots. They cited the “frustrations of powerlessness” among the causes of the incidents, 
adding that the “frustrations are reflected in alienation and hostility toward the 
institutions of law and government and the white society which controls them, and in the 
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reach toward racial consciousness and solidarity reflected in the slogan ‘Black Power.’”
6
 
Interestingly, the report’s only record of the slogan’s use during an urban confrontation is 
by a child. In New Brunswick, New Jersey, where violence threatened to spread from 
nearby Plainfield and crowds of angry residents gathered in the streets, a black minister 
attempted to intercept a group of marching teenagers. Suddenly “a small boy, about 13 
years old, looked up at the minister: ‘Black power, baby!’ he said.”
7
  According to civil 
rights worker Tom Hayden, groups of teenagers in Newark chanted “Black Power!” as 
they broke shop windows.
8
 These anecdotes illustrate the extraordinary energy behind 
Black Power; unlike Martin Luther King’s teachings of nonviolence, Black Power had 
risen beyond a mere civil rights tactic, transferring effectively from Carmichael’s 
speeches to the streets of Northern cities. Even children knew the phrase “Black Power.”  
 The commission’s profile of the average riot participant also suggests the 
significance of Black Power in American cities. The commission rejected the media’s 
portrayal of rioters as criminals and deviants, depicting the typical participant as a 
“Negro, unmarried male between the ages of 15 and 24,” working as an unskilled laborer. 
However, the average rioter was usually slightly better-educated than his peers, and 
“feels strongly that he deserves a better job and that he is barred from achieving 
it…because of discrimination by employers.”
9
 But most significantly, the commission 
found that rioters were more likely to follow current events and were more 
knowledgeable about politics than many of their counterparts. The average rioter was 
also likely to be involved in civil rights, but was “extremely distrustful of the political 
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system and of political leaders.”
10
 This average rioter, a disenfranchised young man, 
suspicious of both the white power structure and traditional black leaders, was the ideal 
audience for Stokely Carmichael’s call for Black Power. Black Power made traditional 
African-American leaders obsolete and questioned the effectiveness of the existing civil 
rights movement, just as the commission’s profiled rioters did.
11
 In his account of the 
riots in Newark, Hayden noted that although most of that city’s rioters were not actively 
involved in the civil rights movement, they “liked and understood the slogan ‘black 
power.’”
12
 
The commission also discovered that riot participants subscribed to another aspect 
of the Black Power ideology: pride in their heritage. Surveys conducted in Detroit and 
Newark also revealed strong feelings of racial pride and superiority among rioters. One 
respondent said that when he participated in the disturbances he was “feeling proud, man, 
at the fact that I was a Negro…I didn’t feel ashamed of my race because of what [rioters] 
did.”
13
 The commission noted that the typical rioter “takes great pride in his race and 
believes that in some respects Negroes are superior to whites.”
14
 This attitude also aligns 
with the growth of Black Power, which emphasized black pride and self-reliance. Black 
Power also rejected the goal of integration, a goal that must have seemed pointless to 
ghetto-dwellers in the supposedly-integrated North.
15
 
  The Kerner Commission viewed Black Power as a major part of the problem in 
racial violence. But could it also offer a solution? No, the commission concluded. They 
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felt that the growth of Black Power would increase racial polarization and create a nation 
of “two societies.” As white residents flocked to the suburbs to escape urban blight, inner 
cities were becoming predominantly black. This meant that fewer tax dollars were 
available to support inner cities as middle-class residents moved away. Urban 
infrastructure continued to decay, and political power shifted away from the cities along 
with the wealthier middle and upper classes. Although many black leaders felt that 
predominantly black cities would lead to increased black leadership, the commission 
warned that by 1985, the segregated, inner-city black population would reach 21 million, 
a number larger than the 1967 population of every African nation except Nigeria: 
If developing a racially integrated society is extraordinarily difficult today 
when 12.1 million Negroes live in central cities, then it is quite clearly 
going to be virtually impossible in 1985 when almost 21 million 
Negroes—still much poorer and less educated than most whites—will be 
living there.
16
   
 
The commission offered three “choices for the future:” to continue with present policies 
(which would lead to increased poverty and unrest), to choose a process of enrichment (a 
process favored by proponents of Black Power), or to integrate. The Kerner Commission 
saw integration as the country’s only hope; however, they offered few practical 
suggestions on how to achieve this end.
17
 
 The “enrichment choice,” as the commission put it, would depend on social 
programs (such as those instituted by Johnson as part of his War on Poverty) to improve 
the quality of life in the inner city. This strategy, the report claims, aligned with the Black 
Power ideology in that it would allow African-Americans to gain leadership in their 
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communities and make decisions that would benefit themselves.
18
 However, the report 
fails to explain how adding more (presumably white-led) social programs to the existing 
power structure would enable inner-city blacks to take control of their own futures. The 
only certain outcome of the enrichment choice was demographical; by funding social 
programs in the inner cities instead of working for integration, whites would continue 
their migration to the suburbs while large cities would become overwhelmingly black. 
“In short,” the report said, “this argument would regard predominantly Negro central 
cities and predominantly white outlying areas not as harmful, but as an advantageous 
future.”
19
 Many blacks agreed. Civil rights workers emphasized the importance of black 
leadership in city government and community schools. While “enriching” the ghetto 
through federal dollars would help, they believed that power was the answer to ending 
inner-city poverty.
 20
 Stokely Carmichael used this argument to support his Black Power 
ideology: 
 …the society either pretends it doesn’t know of [ghetto conditions], or is  
incapable of doing anything meaningful about it. And this resistance to 
doing anything meaningful about conditions in that ghetto comes from the 
fact that the ghetto is itself a product of a combination of forces and 
special interests in the white community, and the groups that have access 
to the resources and power to change that situation benefit, politically and 
economically, from the existence of that ghetto. 
 
As Carmichael saw it, poor blacks needed to take control of their own communities 
because the white power structure could not be counted upon to address inner-city 
problems. 
                                                
18
 Ibid., 223. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Rebellion, 6-7. 
 Constructing the Past 53 
Kerner and his fellow commission members admitted that supporters of Black 
Power did have a point: “It is not surprising that some Black-Power [sic] advocates are 
denouncing integration and claiming that, given the hypocrisy and racism that pervade 
white society, life in a black society is, in fact, morally superior.”
21
 However, the 
commission believed that the “enrichment choice” was impractical and, at worst, 
dangerous to the country’s future. Increased social programs would cost billions of 
dollars, and Johnson’s idealistic War on Poverty was already competing for funds with 
the war in Vietnam. Furthermore, the implementation of these ambitious programs could 
take years, and the commission regarded American cities as ticking time bombs.
22
 
Finally, the commission believed that integration was the only way to achieve racial 
equality. To keep blacks segregated in inner cities, even while funding programs to 
improve conditions in these areas, would be to return to a doctrine of “separate but 
equal.” If polarization continued, the commission warned, “the Negro society will be 
permanently relegated to its current status, possibly even if we expend great amounts of 
money and effort in trying to ‘gild’ the ghetto.”
23
  
 When Johnson created the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders in the wake of the Detroit riots in July 1967, he told the nation, “There will be 
attempts to interpret the events of the past few days. But when violence strikes, then 
those in public responsibility have an immediate and a very different job: not to analyze, 
but to end disorder.”
24
 The Kerner Commission’s effectiveness in ending the disorder that 
gripped the nation’s cities is debatable. Its goal of integration has never been fully 
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realized, and urban decay and “white flight” to the suburbs are still issues faced by 
today’s policy makers. Predominantly black schools still lag behind white schools in test 
scores and funding, and black citizens still fear police brutality. However, despite 
Johnson’s insistence that analysis was secondary to finding solutions, the Kerner 
Commission compiled a reasonable interpretation of the causes of the ghetto riots. 
Although many supporters of Black Power insisted that it was not a violent or 
militant movement, the urban riots of the mid-1960s led white Americans to fear that a 
new race war was beginning on the nation’s city streets. The Kerner Commission shared 
this fear, and their 1968 report to President Johnson is evidence of their mistrust of Black 
Power. The commission continued its pursuit of the traditional goal of the civil rights 
movement—integration. But the movement itself had changed, and African-Americans 
no longer felt that integration was the magic solution to the race problem in the United 
States. Black Power, once an outgrowth of the movement, had become the movement 
itself as the battleground shifted from the fields of the south to the teeming ghettos of the 
urban north. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
